Manuel Castells
European cities, the informational society, and the global economy
I. Urban sociology, today Cities are socially determined in their forms and in their processes. Some of their determinants are structural, linked to deep trends of social evolution that transcend geographic or social singularity. Others are historically and culturally specific. And all are played out, and twisted, by social actors that oppose their interests and their values, to project the city of their dreams and to fight the space of their nightmares. Sociological analysis of urban evolution must start from the theoretical standpoint of considering the complexity of these interacting trends in a given time-space context. The last twenty years of urban sociology have witnessed an evolution of thinking (including my own) from structuralism to subjectivism, then to an attempt, whatever imperfect, of integrating both perspectives into a structural theory of urban change that, if a label rooted in an intellectual tradition is necessary, I would call Marxian, once history has freed the Marxian theoretical tradition from the terrorist tyranny of Marxism-Leninism. I intend to apply this theoretical perspective to the understanding of the fundamental transformations that are taking place in Western European cities at the end of the second millenium. In order to understand such transformations we have to refer to major social trends that are shaking up the foundations of our existence: the coming of a technological revolution centered on information technologies, the formation of a global economy, the transition to a new society, the informational society, that, without ceasing to be capitalist or statist, replaces the industrial society as the framework of social institutions. But this analysis has to be at the same time general and structural (if we accept that a historical transformation is under way) and specific to a given social and cultural context, such as Western Europe (with all due acknowledgement to its internal differentiation). In recent years, a new trade mark as become popular in urban theory: capitalist restructuring. Indeed it is most relevant to pinpoint at the fundamental shift in policies that both governments and corporations have introduced in the 1980s to steer capitalist economies out of their 1970s' crises. Yet, more often than not, the theory of capitalist restructuring has missed the specificity of the process of transformation in each area of the world, as well as the variation of the cultural and political factors that shape the process of economic restructuring, and ultimately determine its outcome. Thus, the deindustrialization processes of New York and London take place at the same time that a wave of industrialization of historic proportions occurs in China and in the Asian Pacific. The rise of the informal economy and of urban dualism takes place in Los Angeles, as well as in Madrid, Miami, Moscow, Bogota, and Kuala Lumpur, but the social paths and social consequences of such similarly structural process are so different as to induce a fundamental variegation of each resulting urban structure. Therefore, in these lectures I will try to analyze some structural trends underlying the current transformation of European cities, while accounting for the historical and social specificity of the processes emerging from such structural transformation. II. The thread of the new history: major social trends affecting european cities at the dawn of the 21st century. Urban life muddles through the pace of history. When such pace accelerates, cities - and their people - become confused, spaces turn threatening, and meaning escapes from experience.In such disconcerting, yet magnificent times, knowledge becomes the only source to restore meaning, and thus meaningful action. At the risk of schematism, and for the sake of clarity, I will summarize what seem to be the main trends that, together and in their interaction, provide the framework of social, economic, and political life for European cities in this particular historical period.First of all, we live in the midst of a fundamental technological revolution, that is characterized by two features: a) As all major technological revolutions in history, their effects are pervasive. They are not limited to the industry, or to the media, or to telecommunications or transportation. New technologies, that have emerged in their applications in full strength since the mid-1970s, are transforming production and consumption, management and work, life and death, culture and warfare, communication and education, space and time. We have entered a new technological paradigm. b) As the industrial revolution was based on energy (although it embraced many other technological fields) the current revolution is based upon information technologies, in the broadest sense of the concept, that includes genetic engineering (after all, the decoding and reprogramming of the codes of the living matter). This technological informational revolution is the backbone (although not the determinant) of all other major structural transformations: While this technological revolution does not determine per se the emergence of a social system, it is an essential component of the new social structure that characterizes our world: the informational society. By such concept, I understand the social structure where the sources of economic productivity, cultural hegemony, and political-military power depend, fundamentally, on the capacity to retrieve, store, process, and generate information and knowledge. Although information and knowledge have been critical for economic accumulation and political power throughout history, it is only under the current technological, social, and cultural parameters that they become directly productive forces. In other words, because of the interconnection of the whole world and because of the potential automation of most standard production and management functions, the generation and control of knowledge, information, and technology is a necessary and sufficient condition to organize the overall social structure around the interests of the information holders. Information becomes the critical raw material of what all social processes and social organizations are made. Material production, as well as services, become subordinate to the handling of information in the system of production and in the organization of society. Empirically speaking, an ever growing majority of employment in Western European Cities refers to information processing jobs. The growing proportion of employment in service activities is not the truly distinctive feature, because of the ambiguity of the notion of "services" (e.g. in Third World cities a majority of the population also works in "services", although there are indeed very different kind of activities). What is truly fundamental is the growing quantitative size and qualitative importance of information processing activities in both goods production and services delivery. Thecontradictory, but ineluctable emergence of the informational society shapes European cities as the onset of the industrial era marked for ever the urban and rural spaces of the nineteenth century. The third major structural trend of our epoch is the formation of a global economy. The global economy concept must be distinguished from the notion of a world economy, that reflects a very old historical reality for most European nations, and particularly for the Netherlands that emerged as a nation through its role as one of the nodal centers of the XVIth century's world economy. Capitalism has accumulated, since its beginnings, on a world-wide scale. This is not to say that the capitalist economy was a global economy. It is only now becoming such. By global economy we mean an economy that works as a unit on real time on a planetary scale. It is an economy where capital flows, labor markets, commodity markets, information, raw materials, management, and organization are internationalized and fully interdependent throughout the planet, although in an asymmetrical form, characterized by the uneven integration to the global system of different areas of the planet. Major functions of the economic system are fully internationalized and interdependent on a daily basis. But many others are segmented and unevenly structured depending upon functions, countries, and regions. Thus, the global economy embraces the whole planet, but not all the regions and all the people in the planet. In fact, only a minority of the people are truly integrated in the global economy, although all the dominant economic and political centers from where people depend are indeed integrated in the global economic networks (with the possible exception of Bhutan...). With the desintegration of the Soviet Empire, the last area of the planet that was not truly integrated in the global economy is restructuring itself in the most dramatic conditions to be able to reach out to the perceived avenues of prosperity of our economic model (China already started its integration in the global capitalist economy in December 1979, while trying to preserve its Statist political regime). This global economy increasingly concentrates wealth, technology, and power in "the North", a vague geopolitical notion that replaces the obsolete West-East differentiation, and that roughly corresponds to the OECD countries. The East has disintegrated and is quickly becoming an economic appendix of the North. Or at least such is the avowed project of its new leaders. The "South" is increasingly differentiated. East Asia is quickly escaping from the lands of poverty and underdevelopment to link up, in fact, with the rising sun of Japan, in a model of development that the Japanese writers love to describe as "the flying geese pattern", with Japan of course leading the way, and the other Asian nations taking off harmoniously under the technological guidance and economic support of Japan. China is at the crossroads of a potential process of substantial economic growth at a terrible human cost as hundreds of millions of peasants are being uprooted without structures able to integrate them into the new urban-industrial world. South and South East Asia struggle to survive the process of change, looking for a subordinate, yet livable position in the new world order. Most of Africa, on the contrary, finds itself increasingly disconnected from the new, global economy, reduced to piecemeal, secondary functions that see the continent deteriorate, with the world only waking up from time to time to the structural genocide taking place in Africa when television images strike the moral counsciousness of public opinion and affect the political interest of otherwise indifferent policy makers. Latin America, and many regions and cities around the world, struggle in the in-between land of being only partially integrated into the global economy, and then submitted to the tensions between the promise of full integration and the daily reality of a marginal existence. In this troubled world, Western Europe has, in fact, become a fragile island of prosperity, peace, democracy, culture, science, welfare, and civil rights. However, the selfish reflex of trying to preserve this heaven by erecting walls against the rest of the world, may undermine the very fundaments of European culture and of democratic civilization, since the exclusion of the other is not separable from the repression of the civil liberties and the mobilization against the alien cultures. Major European cities have become nodal centers of the new global economy, but they have also seen themselves transformed into the magnets of attraction for millions of human beings from all around the world who want to share the peace, democracy, and prosperity of Europe in exchange for their hard labor, and their commitment to a promised land. But the overcrowded and aged Western Europe of the late twentieth century does not seem to be as open to the world as was the young, mostly empty America of the beginning of the century. Immigrants are not welcome, as Europe tries to embark into a new stage of its common history, building the supra-national Europe without renouncing to national identities. Yet, the cultural isolationism of the paneuropean construction is inseparable of the affirmation of ethnic nationalism that will eventually turn not only against the "alien immigrants" but against European foreigners as well. European cities will have to cope with its new global economic role while accommodating to a multi-ethnic society that emerges from the same roots that sustain the global economy. The fourth fundamental process under way in European cities is the process of European integration, into what will amount in the 21st Century to some form of Confederation of the present nation states. This is an ineluctable process for at least 15 countries (the current 12 EC countries plus Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland) regardless of the fate of the symbolic Maastricht Treaty. If, as it is generally accepted, the European Community is heading toward a common market, a common resident status for all its citizens, a common technology policy, a common currency, a common defense, and a common foreign policy, all the basic prerogatives of the national state will be shifted to the European institutions by the end of the Century. This will certainly be a tortuous path, with the nostalgics of the past, neo-fascists, neo-communists, and fundamentalists of all kind, fighting the tide of European solidarity, fueling the fears of the ignorance among people, building upon demagogy and opportunism. Yet, whatever difficult the process, and with substantial modifications to the current technocratic blueprints, Europe will come to existence: there are too many interests and too much political will at stake to see the project destroyed after having come this far. The process of European integration will cause the internationalization of major political decision making processes, and thus it will trigger the fear of subordination of specific social interests to supranational institutions. But most of these specific interests express themselves on a regional or local basis rather than at the national level. Thus, we are witnessing the renewal of the role of regions and cities as locuses of autonomy and political decision. In particular, major cities throughout Europe constitute the nervous system of both the economy and the political system of the continent. The more national states fade in their role, and the more cities emerge as a driving force in the making of the new European society. The process of historical transition experienced by European cities leads to an identity crisis in its cultures and in its people, that becomes another major element of the new urban experience. This identity crisis is the result of two above mentioned processes that, whatever contradictory among themselves, jointly contribute to shake up the foundations of European national and local cultures. On the one hand, the march to supranationality blurs national identities and make people uncertain about the power holders of their destiny, thus pushing them into withdrawl, either individualistic (neo-libertarianism) or collective (neo-nationalism). On the other hand, the arrival of millions of immigrants and the consolidation of multi-ethnic, multi-cultural societies in most Western European countries, confronts Europe head on with the reality of a non-homogeneous culture, precisely at the moment when national identity is most threatened. It follow a crisis of cultural identity (with the corollary of collective alienation) that will mark the urban processes in Europe for the years to come. More to the point: major cities will concentrate the overwhelming proportion of immigrants and ethnic minority citizens (the immigrants' sons and daughters). Thus they will also be at the forefront of the waves of racism and xenophobia that will shake up the institutions of the new Europe even before they come into existence. As a reaction to the national identity crisis we observe the emergence of territorially defined identities at the level of the region, of the city, of the neighborhood. European cities will be increasingly oriented toward their local culture, while increasingly distrustful of higher order cultural identities. The issue then is to know if cities can reach out to the whole world without surrendering to a localistic, quasi-tribal reaction that will create a fundamental divide between local cultures, European institutions, and the global economy.European cities are also affected by the rise of the social movements of the informational society, and in particular by the two central movements of the informational society: the environmental movement, and the women's movement. The environmental movement is at the origin of the rise of the ecological counsciousness that has substantially affected urban policies and politics. The issue of sustainable development is indeed a fundamental theme of our civilization and a dominant topic in today's political agendas. Because major cities in Europe are at the same time the nodal centers of economic growth and the living places for the most environmentally-conscious segment of the population, the battles for the integration between economic growth and environmental conservation will be fought in the streets and institutions of major European cities. The structural process of transformation of women's condition, in dialectical interaction with the rise of the feminist movement, has completely changed the social fabric of cities. Labor markets have been massively feminized, resulting in a change in the conditions of work and management, of struggle and negociation, and ultimately in the weakening of a labor movement that could not overcome its sexist tradition. This also points to the possibility of a new informational labor movement that beacuse it will have to be based on women's rights and concerns, as well as on those of men, it will be historically different from its predecessor. At the same time, the transformation of households and of the domestic division of labor is fundamentally changing the demands on collective consumption, and thus urban policy. For instance, child care is becoming as important an issue as housing in today's cities. Transportation networks have to accommodate for the demands of two workers in the family, instead of relying on the free driving service provided by the suburban housewife in the not so distant past. Some of the new social movements, the most defensive, the most reactive, have taken and will be taking the form of territorially-based counter-cultures, occupying a given space to cut themselves from the outside world, hopeless of being able to transform the society they refuse. Because such movements are likely to occur in major cities, that concentrate a young, educated population, as well as marginal cultures that accommodate themselves in the cracks of the institutions, we will be witnessing a constant struggle over the occupation of meaningful space in the main European cities, with business corporations trying to appropriate the beauty and the tradition for their noble quarters, and urban coutercultures making a stand on the use value of the city, while local residents try to go on with their living, refusing to be bent by the alien wind of the new history. Beyond the territorial battles between social movements and elite interests, the new marginality, unrelated to such social movements, is spreading over the urban space. Drug addicts, drug dealers, and drug victims populate the back alleys of Europen cities, creating the unpredictable, waking up our own psychic terrors, and tarnishing the shine of civilized prosperity at the daily coming of darkness. The "black holes" of our society, those social conditions from where there is no return, take also their territory, making cities tremble at the fear of their unavowed misery. The occupation of urban space by the new poverty and the new marginality takes two forms: the tolerated ghettoes, where marginalized people are permitted to stay, out of sight of the mainstream society; the open presence in the core area of cities by "street people", a risky strategy, but at the same time a survival technique since only there they exist, and thus only there can they relate to society, either looking for a chance or provoking a final blow. Because the informational society concentrates wealth and
power, while polarizing social groups according to their skills,
unless deliberate policies correct the structural tendencies, we
are also witnessing the emergence of social dualism, that could
ultimately lead to the formation of a dualcity, a fundamental
concept that I will characterize below, when considering the
spatial consequences of the structural trends and social processes
that I have proposed as constituting the framework that underlies
the new historical dynamics of European
cities. First of all, the national-international business center is the economic engine of the city in the informational-global economy. Without it, there is no wealth to be appropriated in a given urban space, and the crisis overwhelms any other project in the city, as survival becomes the obvious priority. The business center is made up of an infraestructure of telecommunications, communications, urban services, and office space, based upon technology and educational institutions. It thrives through information processing and control functions. It is sometimes complemented by tourism and travel facilities. It is the node of the space of flows that charaterizes the dominant space of informational societies. That is, the abstract space constituted in the networks of exchange of capital flows, information flows, and decisions that link directional centers among themselves throughout the planet. Because the space of flows needs nodal points to organize its exchange, business centers and their ancillary functions constitute the localities of the space of flows. Such localities do not exist by themselves but by their connection to other similar localities organized in a network that forms the actual unit of management, innovation, and power. Secondly, the informational society is not disincarnated. New elites make it work, although they do not necessarily base their power and wealth in majority ownership of the corporations. The new managerial-technocratic-political elite does however create exclusive spaces, as segregrated and removed from the city at large as the bourgeois quarters of the industrial society. In European cities, unlike in America, the truly exclusive residential areas tend to appropriate urban culture and history, by locating in rehabilitated areas of the central city, emphasizing the basic fact that when domination is clearly established and enforced, the elite does not need to go into a suburban exile, as the weak and fearful American elite needed to do to escape from the control of the urban populace(with the significant exceptions of New York, San Francisco, and Boston). Indeed, the suburban world of European cities is a socially diversified space, that is segmented in different peripheries around the central city. There are the traditional working class suburbs (either blue collar or white collar) of the well kept subsidized housing estates in home ownership. There are the new towns, inhabited by a young cohort of lower middle class, whose age made difficult for them to penetrate the expensive housing market of the central city. And there are also the peripheral ghettos of the older public housing estates where new immigrant populations and poor working families experience their exclusion from the city.Suburbs are also the locus of industrial production in European cities, both for traditional manufacturing and for the new high technology industries that locate in new peripheries of the major metropolitan areas, close enough to the communication centers but removed from older industrial districts. Central cities are still shaped by their history. Thus, traditional working class neighborhoods, increasingly populated by service workers rather than by industrial workers, constitute a distinctive space, a space that, becasue it is the most vulnerable, becomes the battleground between the redevelopment efforts of business and the upper middle class, and the invasion attempts of the counter-cultures trying to reappropriate the use value of the city. Thus, they often become defensive spaces for workers who have only their home to fight for, becoming at the same time meaningful popular neighborhoods and likely bastions of xenofobia and localism. The new professional middle class is torn between the attraction to the peaceful confort of the boring suburbs and the excitement of a hectic, and often too expensive, urban life. The structure of the household generally determines the spatial choice. The more women play a role in the household, and the more the proximity to jobs and urban services in the city makes central urban space attractive to the new middle class, triggering the process of gentrification of central city. On the contrary, the more patriarchal is the middle class family, and the more is likely to observe the withdrawl to the suburb, to raise children, all economic conditions being equal. The central city is also the locus for the ghettoes of the new immigrants, linked to the underground economy, and to the networks of support and help needed to survive in a hostile society. Concentration of immigrants in some dilapidated urban areas in European cities is not the equivalent however to the experience of the American ghettoes, because the overwhelming majority of European ethnic minorities are workers, earning their living, and raising their families, thus counting on a very strong support structure that makes their ghettoes strong, family-oriented communities, unlikely to be taken over by street crime. It is in the core administrative and entertainment district of European cities where urban marginality makes itself present. Its pervasive occupation of the busiest streets, and public transportation nodal points, is a survival strategy destined to be present, so that they can receive public attention or private business, be it welfare assistance, a drug transaction, a prostitution deal, or the customary police care. Major European metropolitan centers present some variation around the structure of urban space we have outlined, depending upon their differential role in the European economy. The lower their position in the new informational network, the greater the difficulty of their transition from the industrial stage, and the more traditional will be their urban structure, with old established neighorhoods and commercial quarters playing the determinant role in the dynamics of the city. On the contrary, the higher their position into the competitive structure of the new European economy, the greater their role of their advanced services inthe business district, and the more intense will be the restructuring of the urban space. At the same time, in those cities where the new European society reallocates functions and people throughout the space, immigration, marginality, and countercultures will be the most present, fighting over the control of the territory, as identities become increasingly defined by the appropriation of space. The critical factor in the new urban processes is, however, the fact that urban space is incresingly differentiated in social terms, while being functionally inter-related beyond physical contiguity. It follows the separation between symbolic meaning, location of functions, and the social appropriation of space in the metropolitan area.The transformation of European cities is inseparable of a deeper, structural transformation that affects urban forms and processes in advanced societies: the coming of the Informational City. IV. The informational
city Thus, the new international and inter-regional division of labor ushered in by the informational society leads, at the world level, to three simultaneous processes: In the new economy, the productivity and competitiveness of regions and cities is determined by their ability to combine informational capacity, quality of life, and connectivity to the network of major metropolitan centers at the national and international level. Thus, the new spatial logic, characteristic of the Informational City, is determined by the preeminence of the space of flows over the space of places. By space of flows I refer to the system of exchanges of information, capital, and power that structures the basic processes of societies, economies, and states between different localities, regardless of localization. I call it "space" because it does have a spatial materiality: the directional centers located in a few selective areas of a few, selected localities; the telecommunication system, dependent upon telecommunication facilities and services that are unevenly distributed in the space, thus marking a telecommunicated space; the advanced transportation system, that makes such nodal points dependent from major airports and airlines services, from freeway systems, from high speed trains; the security systems necessary to the protection of such directional spaces, surrounded by a potentially hostile world; and the symbolic marking of such spaces by the new monumentality of abstraction, making the locales of the space of flows meaningfully meaningless, both in their internal arrangement and in their architectural form. The space of flows, superseding the space of places, epitomizes the increasing differentiation between power and experience, the separation between meaning and function. The Informational City is at the same time, the Global City, as it articulates the directional functions of the global economy in a network of decision making and information processing centers. Such globalization of urban forms and processes goes beyond the functional and the political, to influence consumption patterns, life styles, and formal symbolism. Finally, the Informational City is also the Dual City. This is because the informational economy has a structural tendency to generate a polarized occupational structure, according to the informational capabilities of different social groups. Informational productivity at the top may incite structural unemployment at the bottom or downgrading of the social conditions of manual labor, particularly if the control of labor unions is weakened in the process and if the institutions of the welfare state are undermined by the concerted assault of conservative politics and libertarian ideology. The filling in of downgraded jobs by immigrant workers tends to reinforce the dualization of the urban social structure. In a parallel movement, the age differential between an increasingly older native population in European cities and a younger population of newcomers and inmigrants, builds two extreme segments of citizens polarized along lines of education, ethnicity, and age simultaneously. It follows the potential surge of social tensions.The necessary mixing of functions in the same metropolitan area leads to the attempt to preserve social segregation and functional differentiation through planning of the spatial layout of activities and residences, sometimes by public agencies, some times by the influence of real estate prices. It follows the formation of cities made up of spatially coexisting, socially exclusive groups and functions, that live in an increasingly uneasy tension vis a vis each other. Defensive spaces emerge as a result of the tension. This leads to the fundamental urban dualism of our time. The one opposing the cosmopolitanism of the elite, living on a daily connection to the whole world (functionnally, socially, culturally), to the tribalism of local communities, retrenched in their spaces that they try to control as their last stand against the macro-forces that shape their lifes out of their reach. The fundamental dividing line in our cities is the inclusion of the cosmopolitans in the making of the new history while excluding the locals from the control of the global city to which ultimately their neighborhoods belong. Thus, the Informational City, the Global City, and the Dual
City are closely inter-related, forming the background of urban
processes in Europe's major metropolitan centers. The fundamental
issue at stake is the increasing lack of communication between the
directional functions of the economy, and the informational elite
that performs such functions, on the one hand, and the
locally-oriented population that experiences an ever deeper
identity crisis, on the other hand. The separation between
function and meaning, translated into the tension between the
space of flows and the space of places, could become a major
destabilizing force in European cities, potentially ushering in a
new type of urban crisis. The most important challenge to be met in European cities, as well as in major cities throughout the world, is the articulation of the globally-oriented economic functions of the city with the locally-rooted society and culture. The separation between these two levels of our new reality leads to structural urban schizophrenia that threatens our social equilibrium and our quality of life. Furthermore, the process of European integration forces a dramatic restructuring of political institutions, as national States see their functions gradually voided of relevance, pulled from the top toward supranational institutions and from the bottom toward increasing regional and local autonomy. Paradoxically, in an increasinggly global economy, and with the rise of the supranational state, local governments appear to be at the forefront of the process of management of the new urban contradictions and conflicts. National states are increasingly powerless to control the global economy, and at the same time they are not flexible enough to deal specifically with the problems generated in a given local society. Local governments seem to be equally powerless vis a vis the global trends but much more adaptable to the changing social, economic, and functional environment of cities. The effectiveness of the political institutions of the new Europe will depend more on their capacity of negociation and adaptation, than on the amount of power that they command, since such power will be fragmented and shared across a variety of decision making processes and organizations. Thus, instead of trying to master the whole complexity of the new European society, governments will have to deal with specific sets of problems and goals in specific local circumstances. This is why local governments, in spite of their limited power, could be in fact the most adequate instances of management of these cities, working in the world economy and living in the local cultures. The strenghtening of local governments is thus a pre-condition to the management of European cities. But local governments could only exercise such management potential if they engage in at least three fundamental policies: Thus, the historical specificity of European cities may be a fundamental asset in creating the conditions for managing the contradictions between the global and the local in the new context of the informational society. Because European cities have strong civil societies, rooted in and old history, and in a rich, diversified culture, they could stimulate citizen participation as a fundamental antidote against tribalism and alienation. And because the tradition of European cities as city states leading the pace to the Modern Age in much of Europe is engraved in the collective memory of their people, the revival of the city state could be the necessary complement to the expansion of a global economy and to the creation of a European State. The old urban tradition of Amsterdam as a political center, as a trade center, and as a center of culture and innovation, suddenly becomes more strategically important for the next stage of urban civilization that the meaningless suburban sprawl of high technology complexes that characterize the informational space in other areas of the world. European cities, because they are cities and not just locales,
could manage the articulation between the space of flows and the
space of places, between function and experience, between power
and culture, thus recreating the city of the future by building on
the foundations of their past. Selected bibliography CASTELLS, M.The Informational City, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. SASSEN, S. The Global City: New York, London, and Tokyo, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991. MOLLENKOPF, J. and CASTELLS, M. (eds), Dual City: Restructuring New York, New York: Russell Sage, 1991. JUDD,D. and PARKINSON,M, (eds), Leadership and Urban Regeneration: Cities in North America and Europe, Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990. CASTELLS, M., The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. KINGS D.S. and PIERRE J. (eds.) Challenges to Local Governments, London: Sage, 1990. HALL, P. and PRESTON, P. The Carrier Wave: New Information Technology and the Geography of Innovation, 1846-2003, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988. BROTCHIE, J.F., HALL, P. and NEWTON, P.W. (eds.) The Spatial Impact of Technological Change, London: Croom Helm, 1987. PORTES, A. et alter (eds), The Informal Economy, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988. CAMPOS VENUTI G., L'urbanistica del riformismo, Roma: Franco Angeli, 1991. (new edition) BORJA, J. et alter (eds.) Las grandes ciudades en la decada de los noventa, Madrid: Sistema, 1991. CASTELLS, M. and HALL P. Technopoles of the World, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1993. CARNOY,M; CASTELLS,M; COHEN, S.; and CARDOSO, F.H., The New World Economy in the Information Age, University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1993. | |